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PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE RASH-GULLION ACT
I am writing this article for publication in the hope of
reaching the legal talent of the state and thereby creating sentiment in favor of what I conceive to be needed changes in the
Rash-Gullion act.
For more than three years I have been trying to enforce
this act in the 28th judicial district, composed of Clinton,
Wayne, Pulaski and Rockcastle counties, and from actual observation and experience have had occasion to discover its weak
points and its strong points. What I say here may cause some
people to conclude that I am not as dry as I ought to be. But
this charge will not be brought against me by those who know
me well and therefore know that both in theory and practice I
am a "chief among the drys."
Much good thas been accomplished in the 28th district by
the strict enforcement of this act. It is very seldom that one sees
a drunken man. Many men who used to be down-and-out
drunkards are now "clothed and in their right minds," and
earning a ccent living for themselves and their families.
I would not therefore change the act in so far as it makes
it unlawful to make or sell intoxicating liquors or to have a
moonshine still outfit or parts of such outfit in one's possession,
and imposes both a fine and jail sentence for a violation. The
men who do these things are criminals; they are outlaws, and
they ought both to pay a fine and go to jail upon conviction.
But I would change the law in regard to possessing, giving, or
transporting liquors, so as to give the trial jury or the court
some discretion. Under the present law neither court nor jury
has any discretion in such matters. The conviction for either
of these offenses must carry with it a fine of not less than
$100.00 and a jail sentence of not less than thirty days. It is
not so in the federal courts, and recently when it was proposed
that the Volstead Act be so amended as to carry both a fine and
a jail sentence upon conviction, and thus rob the federal courts
of all discretion, the President. of the United States frankly
stated that such a law would be too drastic, and that such punishment would be cruel and unreasonable.
Under the Rash-Gullian Act one may give his neighbor a
drink of whisky or he may be caught with a gill of whisky in
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his possession, or he may transport a gill of whisky for a few
steps and in each case he has incurred a penalty of not less than
$100.00 and a jail sentence of not less than thirty days. These
things are, of course, violations of the act and therefore wrong,
but in my judgment the penalty is out of all proportion to the
offense committed. A man may be guilty of either of these
three offenses and yet not be in the liquor business and therefore not a very bad man or a very bad criminal.
The enforcement of this law has compelled me to send
some men to jail who had been convicted of these latter offenses
when my conscience almost rebelled, and my very soul cried
out against it. Such convictions and penalties do not help the
cause of law enforcement. The criminal element is already too
large, and that element is being made larger out of men who are
not criminals. Our jails are thereby crowded, and in many
counties numerous jail sentences have become a burden to taxpayers.
Let us suppose a case, say, of an eighteen year old boy
who is caught with a bottle of moonshine whisky in his possession. He has never been in court before. He has made a
misstep-he has patronized a bootlegger; he is not in the liquor
business himself and has never before been accused of violating
any law. He is hailed into court on a charge of unlawfully possessing whisky, is tried, convicted and given $100.00 fine and
thirty days in jail. He goes to jail a fairly good boy and thirty
days of association with criminals turns him out a hardened
criminal. His self-respect is gone. He is in line for further
violations of the law and for further expense to the county
or state. Surely no one will say that the cause of law enforcement has been helped in such a case.
There is no statute that gives a state judge any right to
suspend a judgment, or any part of a judgment, in a criminal or
penal action. In the case of the eighteen year old boy, supposed above, a circuit court judge has not the power to suspend
the jail sentence of the boy conditioned upon his good behavior. To jail he must go, unless the Governor interferes.
Our Court of Appeals has decided that trial judges have no
power to suspend judgments in such cases. Brabant v. Cornmonwealth,* The fact is that a Kentucky circuit judge under
*157 Ky. 13, 162 S. W. 786.
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the present state of our laws has neither power nor discretion.
He is about as helpless an individual as one ever sees. If an
amendment is introduced in our next legislature to cure these
defects in the Rash-Gullion Act I will be glad to go before the
committee having it in charge and give them the benefit of my
actual experience and observation. And I will not hesitate to
recommend that in case of transporting, giving or possessing
liquors, the act should be so amended as to give the court or jury
the discretion of saying whether the defendant should be fined
or imprisoned, or both. I would not reduce the amount of the
fine nor the length of the jail sentence in such cases, but would
simply recommend that the law be so amended as that the court
or jury should be permitted to have the discretion of saying
whether a defendant charged with these violations should have
both the fine and jail sentence, or only one.
These changes in the act would not be a step backward;
they would be an advance step. They would not cripple the
act; they would greatly strengthen it. Then unlawful expedients now practiced by some of our courts would not be resorted to. For instance, the Commonwealth's attorney in one
district in Kentucky has. stated that it is his custom to have
his grand juries return an indictment for drunkenness against
each person indicted for transporting, possessing or giving
liquors, so that he can take a judgment for $100.00 and costs
on the drunkenness charge and file or dismiss the other charge.
Of course, he would only accept such a compromise where the
facts would indicate that the defendant was not in the liquor
business. In other courts in such cases an order is sometimes
made reducing the offense to drunkenness or breach of the peace
and a fine of say $100.00 and costs entered against the defendant, in order that the defendant may not have to serve a jail
sentence. And still other expedients are resorted to. Courts
of conscience cannot in every case rigidly enforce the RashGullion Act and juries of conscience can hardly be goaded to
the point of giving a young man of good family, of say,
eighteen years of age, a jail sentence for having been found
with a gill of whisky in his possession.
With these changes made in our state prohibitory laws,
the courts and juries can and will enforce them, and at the
same time a wholesome respect for these laws will be encour-
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aged. Then we will make real headway, and violations of these
laws will. be reduced to the mium.
H. C. X
Y,
Judge, Twenty-eight. JudiciaZ District
Somerset, Kentucky.
July 31, 1925.

